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In this paper, we investigate the post-IPO operating performance of acquiring companies listed
in the US in the period 1986–2008. We ¯nd that acquiring IPO ¯rms delivers better operating
returns when compared to non-acquiring IPO ¯rms in the ¯ve years after the listing. This result
holds controlling for both IPO and ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics. Furthermore, acquiring targets
already listed on the stock exchange and running stock deals are associated with the improved
operating performance. Finally, we ¯nd that acquisitions also a®ect the newly listed companies'
survival, reducing both the time to failure and the time to being acquired, which suggest a
structural acceleration of the \natural" company lifecycle.
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investments.
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1. Introduction
Companies going public on stock exchanges can raise money to ¯nance capital expen-
ditures (capex), intensify research and development (R&D), pursue growth strategies
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in the global arena and, furthermore, to acquire other ¯rms through either cash or
stock deals (Ritter 1991, Pagano et al. 1998, Ritter 2002, Celikyurt et al. 2010).
Recently, researchers have shown that newly public ¯rms are very active
acquirers in the post-IPO years (Brau & Fawcett 2006, Hovakimian & Hutton 2010,
Hsieh et al. 2011, Rau & Stouraitis 2011). Bernstein (2015) reports that external
growth is important for innovation in IPO companies, as breakthrough patents in
the years after the listing are typically obtained through acquisitions.
A number of papers in the literature explore the relationship between the M&A
activism of IPO companies and their follow-up operating performance, with mixed
results. Brau et al. (2012) ¯nd that acquiring IPO ¯rms experience poorer long-term
performance compared to non-acquiring counterparts. Ben Amor & Kooli (2016)
examine the performance of serial acquirers compared to single acquirers and ¯nd
evidence of underperformance for frequent acquirers. By contrast, Bessler &
Zimmermann (2012) ¯nd superior returns for European post-IPO acquirers.
Bonaventura & Giudici (2018) ¯nd that in Europe, acquiring IPO ¯rms delivers poor
operating returns, as non-acquiring counterparts do.
On a broad perspective, after the listing, the operating performance of newly
listed companies in most cases shows declining trends and a great deal of volatility
when compared to the pre-IPO case. This is both predicted by theoretical models,
namely the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976) and the information asymme-
tries theory (Leland & Pyle 1977), and widely documented by empirical research
(Jain & Kini 1994, Mikkelson et al. 1997).
Conversely, analyzing operating returns following acquisitions is a far more
puzzling issue. E±cient-market models predict improved operating performance of
merging ¯rms compared to the operating performance of standalone ones, while
models based on agency and behavioral theories introduce the possibility of value
destruction for merging ¯rms' shareholders (Roll 1986, Morck et al. 1990).
On the empirical ground, the evidence about operating returns following M&A is
mixed. Some paper documents improved the operating performance after acquisi-
tions (Linn & Switzer 2001, Heron & Lie 2002), while others ¯nd insigni¯cant
changes (Ghosh 2001, Sharma & Ho 2003) and others ¯nd declining operating
pro¯tability (Dickerson et al. 1997).
Furthermore, there is even more disagreement whether M&A characteristics can
predict changes in operating performance. Martynova et al. (2007), in a sample of
858 European M&A deals, ¯nd that none of the typical acquisition characteristics
(method of payment, business relatedness of the target and geographical location of
the target) explains changes in operating performance. Golubov et al. (2015) ¯nd
that ¯rm characteristics predict post-announcement returns. Bonaventura & Giudici
(2018) show that acquisitions ¯nanced with stock lead to poorer pro¯tability.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the relationship between oper-
ating performance and M&A strategies of IPO companies. More speci¯cally, we aim
at answering the following questions: what is the contribution of M&A to the op-
erating performance of IPO ¯rms? What are the M&A characteristics that most
M. Bonaventura et al.
1850005-2
likely a®ect the operating returns of newly public ¯rms? What is the impact of M&A
on ¯rms' survival after the listing?
Three major motivations explain our interest in investigating the impact of M&A
activity on post-IPO operating returns. First, managers and controlling shareholders
have the option to manage the timing of corporate events like IPOs and M&As,
taking advantage of optimistic momentum on the markets (Loughran & Ritter 1995,
Rau & Vermaelen 1998, Malmendier & Tate 2008); therefore, outside investors need
to be clearly aware about corporate strategies and their impact on follow-up per-
formance and survival. Second, the separation between ownership and control after
an IPO increases the incentives to extract private bene¯ts reducing the ¯rms value
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). Managers may be tempted to focus on short-term results
rather than on long-term value creation and to \build an empire" in order to max-
imize their personal reputations (Jensen 1986). Thus, it is important to predict the
impact of alternative acquisition targets on IPO companies' future performance.
Third, the risk of default is more relevant in the early years following an IPO (Jain
& Kini 2008): newly listed ¯rms have to meet analysts' expectations, they are moni-
tored by professional investors and authorities and must disclose more information to
the market, this creating an opportunity for competitors. As such, it is interesting to
investigate if and how M&A activity does truly a®ect the IPO companies' survival.
We study the operating performance and the survival rate of a treatment sample
of 715 US IPO ¯rms conducting at least one acquisition in the ¯rst year following the
listing in the period 1986–2008. More speci¯cally, we compare the operating pro¯t-
ability of acquiring IPO ¯rms to the performance of a control sample of both
matching non-acquiring companies and already listed acquiring companies.
We then investigate through a multivariate analysis whether changes in oper-
ating performance are due to IPO and/or ¯rm characteristics or are due to the
acquisition strategies. Finally, we study the impact of M&A on post-IPO survival of
our treatment sample of newly listed companies.
Our results can be summarized as follows. Contrary to empirical evidence based
on stock returns, we ¯nd that post-IPO acquirers experience better operating per-
formance compared to their non-acquiring peers. More speci¯cally, we ¯nd that non-
acquiring IPO ¯rms tend to underperform the median ¯rm in their industry. On the
other hand, acquiring IPO ¯rms experiences an insigni¯cant change in operating
performance after the IPO compared to industry medians. Their change in perfor-
mance is indeed similar to already listed ¯rms' one in the ¯ve years after the listing.
In other words, it seems that post-IPO acquisitions have a moderating e®ect on the
pro¯tability drop characterizing most IPO ¯rms. Our results hold even after con-
trolling for both IPO and ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics. Improvements in the oper-
ating performance are positively correlated with the presence of a venture capitalist
and with the presence of a top-tier investment bank hired as underwriter, while they
are negatively correlated with the ¯rm's age and with the initial IPO underpricing.
Acquisitions ¯nanced with stock issuances and aimed at taking over companies
already listed on the exchange lead to better performance.
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Finally, we report that acquiring IPO companies is characterized by lower sur-
vival rates compared to their non-acquiring peers, but showing clear and opposite
outcomes: the best performing acquiring IPO companies become the target of other
bidders, while the worst performing ones go bankrupt more quickly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the
research methodology and describes the sample selection process. Section 3 shows the
empirical results. Finally, Sec. 4 draws the conclusions.
2. Sample and Methodology
2.1. The sample
We start identifying all IPOs that took place in the US in the period 1986–2008 from
Thomson One New Issues database. As common in the IPO literature (Ritter 1991,
Rau 2000, Welch & Ritter 2002), we exclude American depositary receipts (ADRs),
unit o®erings and IPOs with an o®er price lower than 5 $. We also exclude ¯nancial
¯rms (two-digit Standard Industry Classi¯cation (SIC) code 60) and IPOs for which
pre-IPO data on assets and operating income are not available. In order to obtain
prices and accounting data, we rely on Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) and Compustat, respectively. After applying these criteria, we retain a
sample of 3823 IPOs.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample and the distribution of
IPOs by year and industry.
In order to identify the IPO ¯rms that completed at least one acquisition in the
¯rst year after their listing, we match IPO data with M&A data from Thomson One
Mergers and Acquisitions database.
Following Bonaventura & Giudici (2018), we exclude acquisitions where the deal
value is lower than 1% of the market value of equity at the IPO and acquisitions
where change of control does not occur (we identify a change of control as an ac-
quisition where the acquirer holds less than 50% of target's shares before the deal and
more than 50% after the deal).
We obtain our treatment sample of 715 IPO acquirers (18.7% of the total sample)
completing 1005 acquisitions from 1986 to 2008 (see again Table 1).
In order to build a control sample, for each IPO ¯rm that completed at least one
acquisition in the ¯rst year after the listing, we ¯nd a non-acquiring IPO-matched
counterpart. The matching algorithm is similar to Barber & Lyon (1996) and
Loughran & Ritter (1997): matching candidates are ¯rms that went public in the
same year of the sample ¯rm; we then require that the matching candidate: (i) has
the same 2 digit SIC code of the sample ¯rm; (ii) exhibits book value of assets
between 20% and 200% of the sample ¯rm's; (iii) is closest in performance with the
sample ¯rm (performance is de¯ned by return on assets (RoA) in the pre-IPO year,
that is the ratio between operating income before depreciation and amortization and
the book value of assets). If no matched ¯rms are found, we remove the size
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constraint. If once again no matched ¯rms are found, we allow the matching ¯rm to
belong to the same 1 digit SIC code. For the remaining ¯rms that have no matching,
we ¯nd the IPO company closest in performance that also respects the size constraint.
Table 2 compares the samples of acquiring IPOs and non-acquiring counterparts.
Because of our matching algorithm, we ¯nd that the asset size of acquiring IPO
companies and non-acquiring counterparts are similar. We also ¯nd that the two
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample IPO companies.
Panel A: Frequency distribution by IPO year
IPO year Number
of IPOs
% of total
sample
Number of
acquiring IPO ¯rms
% of acquirers on
total IPOs
1986 221 5.78 9 4.07
1987 164 4.29 10 6.10
1988 62 1.62 1 1.61
1989 62 1.62 2 3.23
1990 58 1.52 3 5.17
1991 160 4.19 20 12.50
1992 238 6.23 29 12.18
1993 322 8.42 47 14.60
1994 273 7.14 39 14.29
1995 309 8.08 47 15.21
1996 394 10.31 88 22.34
1997 268 7.01 71 26.49
1998 184 4.81 51 27.72
1999 288 7.53 104 36.11
2000 225 5.89 50 22.22
2001 56 1.46 12 21.43
2002 54 1.41 13 24.07
2003 43 1.12 12 27.91
2004 112 2.93 18 16.07
2005 86 2.25 32 37.21
2006 116 3.03 27 23.28
2007 114 2.98 28 24.56
2008 14 0.37 2 14.29
Total 3823 100.00 715 18.70
Panel B: Frequency distribution by industry
Industry 2-digit
SIC code
Number
of IPOs
% of IPOs Number of acquiring
IPO ¯rms
% of acquirers
on total IPOs
Agriculture 01–09 7 3.09  
Natural resource 10–14 119 1.07 26 21.85
Construction 15–17 41 41.87 2 4.88
Manufacturing 20–39 1611 9.04 204 12.66
Transportation, communication
and sanitary services
40–49 348 12.58 83 23.85
Wholesale and retail trade 50–59 484 32.17 70 14.46
Services 70–89 1238 0.18 330 26.66
Total 3823 100.00 715 18.70
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subsamples do not di®er in growth opportunities (proxied by market-to-book (MB)
ratios), underwriter prestige and capex investment in the ¯rst year after the IPO.
On the other hand, acquiring IPO ¯rms is older and more underpriced compared
to non-acquiring counterparts. Their shareholders also retain on average a higher
fraction of equity after the IPO.
Table 3 reports the basic statistics about the acquisition strategies performed by
both the treatment and the control sample companies.
In Panel A, we split the sample of acquiring of IPO ¯rms by the frequency of their
acquisitions.
We ¯nd that most ¯rms (460) perform only one acquisition in the ¯rst year after
going public, while 255 ¯rms (36% of the total sample) close more than one acqui-
sition, actively pursuing external.
In Panel B, we investigate more in detail the characteristics of the acquisitions.
We ¯nd that most of them involve mixed methods of payment. Pure stock o®erings
(202) are slightly more common than pure cash o®erings (189), although the num-
bers are very similar.
Furthermore, we ¯nd that most ¯rms acquire US targets, as only 110 acquisitions
involve cross-border deals. Interestingly, we note that 705 acquisitions aim at
Table 2. Acquiring and non-acquiring IPO ¯rms.
Variable Acquiring IPO ¯rms Non-acquiring IPO ¯rms t-test (Wilcoxon z-test)
Assets 320 296 0.441
(97.18) (73.708) (1.593)
Market-to-book 21.91 18.74 0.424
(9.27) (8.55) (0.935)
Age 16.734 15.750 1.527
(8) (8) (2.054**)
Underpricing 0.321 0.235 2.118**
(0.120) (0.068) (4.009***)
Underwriter reputation 4.961 4.838 0.598
(7.010) (6.500) (0.418)
Retention 0.672 0.521 10.722***
(0.706) (0.676) (6.088***)
Capex 0.210 0.185 1.510
(0.114) (0.116) (0.096)
Notes: This table presents the descriptive characteristics of both the treatment sample of acquiring IPO
companies and the control sample of non-acquiring companies selected with our matching procedure.
Assets is the book value of assets in the pre-IPO year. MB is the ratio between the market value of equity
at the IPO and the book value of assets immediately prior to the IPO. Age is the age of company at the
IPO since inception date. Underpricing is the ratio between the ¯rst day closing price and the IPO o®er
price minus 1. Underwriter reputation is the reputation of the investment bank chosen as underwriter,
according to Ritter's rankings. Retention is the percentage ownership held by insiders after the
IPO. Capex is the total amount of capital expenditures displayed by IPO ¯rms in the ¯rst year after the issue
scaled by book value of assets. Means and medians (in brackets) are reported. The third column shows the
t-statistics (Wilcoxon signed rank z-statistic) testing the equality of mean (medians) between the two sam-
ples. Sample: 715 acquiring US IPO ¯rmsþ 715 matching non-acquiring IPOs listed in the period 1986–2008.
**, *** The di®erence between the two samples is signi¯cant at the 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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business diversi¯cation, while only 300 involve targets operating in the same industry
(according to the 2-digit SIC code).
Finally, we report that only 33 acquisitions involve already listed ¯rms. Of these,
9 acquisitions were declared to be hostile by the management, while 23 of them were
declared to be friendly deals. Not reported in the table, we ¯nd that 15 public targets
were acquired with pure stock o®erings, while 10 involved pure cash deals.
2.2. The methodology
The academic literature has developed various techniques to study operating per-
formance changes after corporate events such as an IPO. More speci¯cally, we need
the selection of: (i) a measure of operating performance; (ii) the de¯nition of an
appropriate benchmark; (iii) a model testing the statistical signi¯cance of operating
performance changes.
Table 3. Characteristics of the acquisitions.
Panel A: One-time and serial acquirers (sample: 715 IPO companies)
Variable Number Percentage over the total sample (%)
Single acquirers 460 64.34
Serial acquirers 255 35.66
Panel B: Acquisition characteristics (sample: 1005 acquisitions)
Method of payment
Cash 189 18,81
Stock 202 20,10
Mixed 614 61,09
Target's geographical location
Local 895 89.05
Cross-border 110 10.95
Target's industry relatedness
Industry related 300 29.85
Diversi¯cation 705 70.15
Public versus private target
Public 33 3.28
of which: Hostile (9) (27.27)
Friendly (24) (72.73)
Private 972 96.72
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the M&A deals for both the
acquiring IPO ¯rms and their acquisitions. Panel A splits the sample in single and
serial acquirers. Panel B breaks down the deals by acquisition-speci¯c char-
acteristics, namely the method of payment, the geographical location of the
target, the industry relatedness of the target with the bidder, the public or
private status of the target and whether the merger is friendly or hostile. The
percentage of hostile and friendly takeovers is computed over acquisition of
public target sample: 715 acquiring US IPO ¯rms in the period 1986–2008.
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The most correct measures of company's performance and value creation involve
the identi¯cation of the operating cash °ows of the company. We use two alternative
proxies of operating cash °ows: the ¯rst measure is the operating income of the
company before depreciation and amortization (EBITDA); the other proxy we
employ is the EBITDA of the company net of investments in working capital (i.e.
increase in inventories, receivables and other current assets net of the increase in
payables and other current liabilities). The two variables are scaled by the book
value of total assetsa at the beginning of the year and are computed annually in a
time window [1; þ5] with respect to the IPO date (year 0). We de¯ne our pro¯t-
ability measures as
RoA ¼ EBITDA=Total assets; ð2:1Þ
CFRoA ðcash flow RoAÞ ¼ ðEBITDAWorking capital inv:Þ=Total assets:
ð2:2Þ
In order to identify an appropriate pro¯tability benchmark and check for any
\abnormal" performance, we employ two alternatives. First, we rely on the matching
sample introduced in Sec. 2.1 (every acquiring IPO company is compared with the
non-acquiring peer). Alternatively, we compute the median performance ratio (either
RoA or CFRoA) for already listed companies operating in the same 2-digit SIC
industry. Therefore, we are able to compare: (i) acquiring IPO ¯rms to non-acquiring
IPO ¯rms; (ii) acquiring IPO ¯rms to the industry; (iii) non-acquiring IPO ¯rms to
the industry.
To identify the abnormal performance, we adopt three di®erent widely accepted
methodologies: the level model (Loughran & Ritter 1997), the intercept model
(Healy et al. 1992), and the change model (Ghosh 2001).
The level model is based on a comparison of the performance of both the control
and the treatment sample year-by-year. For each year in the interval [1; þ5] rel-
ative to the IPO date, we compute the di®erence between the return of the acquiring
IPO company and the return of the benchmark in the year \t"th year after the IPO.
While this method provides insights on the yearly evolution of operating returns and
is often used by researchers, it is not suitable to understand whether a ¯rm has
underperformed or not (Powell & Stark 2005).
To solve the issues related to the level model, the intercept model takes into
account any possible persistence e®ect of the operating performance and consists in
an ordinary least squares regression between the median operating return displayed
by the company after the event (dependent variable) and the median operating
return before the event (independent variable). The latter variables are adjusted
considering the median values of the performance computed for the matching com-
panies belonging to the control sample.
Finally, Ghosh (2001) suggests using non-parametric tests based on the di®erence
of medians rather than parametric tests on the di®erence of means. Following this
a In unreported robustness tests, we scale by revenues, obtaining qualitatively similar results.
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approach, we also perform the change model, computing the di®erence between the
benchmark-adjusted operating performance after and before the IPO date.
3. Empirical Results
3.1. Univariate analysis
Table 4 describes the results of the comparative analysis on the abnormal operating
performance of acquiring IPOs, adopting the three di®erent methodologies described
in Sec. 2.2.
Table 4. Univariate analysis.
Panel A: Level model
RoA: Raw performance
Year 1 (%) 0 (%) 1 (%) 2 (%) 3 (%) 4 (%) 5 (%)
Acquiring IPO ¯rms 11.04 9.86 9.95 9.17 8.36 9.74 9.90
Industry (acquiring) 9.27 8.98 8.70 8.04 7.72 7.35 7.20
Non-acquiring IPO ¯rms 10.90 10.99 10.27 9.81 8.12 8.16 9.32
Industry (non-acquiring) 9.27 9.02 8.22 7.42 7.43 7.44 7.20
Wilcoxon z-test testing the equality of distributions
Acquiring versus industry 0.791 1.476 0.577 0.119 1.078 1.552 2.113**
Non-acquiring versus industry 1.098 0.211 0.465 0.612 1.002 0.352 2.659***
Acquiring versus non-acquiring 0.466 1.377 1.149 0.988 1.614 1.606 0.356
CFRoA: Raw performance
Year 1 (%) 0 (%) 1 (%) 2 (%) 3 (%) 4 (%) 5 (%)
Acquiring IPO ¯rms 12.73 11.20 11.45 10.30 9.51 10.12 10.18
Industry (acquiring) 10.40 9.80 9.73 9.04 8.56 8.23 7.97
Non-acquiring IPO ¯rms 12.45 12.28 11.14 10.53 9.60 8.70 11.07
Industry (non-acquiring) 10.47 10.19 9.56 8.08 8.24 8.23 8.09
Wilcoxon z-test testing the equality of distributions
Acquiring versus industry 0.247 3.362*** 2.276*** 0.897 1.642 1.398 1.139
Non-acquiring versus industry 0.526 2.009** 1.009 0.113 0.978 0.086 2.254**
Acquiring versus non-acquiring 0.281 0.905 0.949 1.357 1.798* 1.856* 0.691
Panel B: Intercept model
Intercept Slope (pre-issue
adjusted performance)
RoA
Acquiring IPOs post-issue performance
(industry adjusted)
0.012* 0.145***
(0.007) (0.035)
Non-acquiring IPOs post-issue perfor-
mance (industry adjusted)
0.038*** 0.224***
(0.010) (0.084)
Acquiring IPOs post-issue performance
(non-acquiring ¯rms adjusted)
0.031*** 0.200***
(0.013) (0.058)
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Panel A shows the di®erences dealing with the raw operating performance.
The median RoA (CFRoA) in the pre-IPO year for acquiring IPO companies is
equal to 11.04% (12.73%). As a result of our matching procedure, acquiring ¯rms'
pre-IPO performance is not statistically di®erent from matched ¯rms' (RoA and
CFRoA are, respectively, equal to 10.90% and 12.45%). We also note that both
acquiring IPO ¯rms and non-acquiring IPO ¯rms show a similar performance com-
pared to industry medians in the pre-IPO year.
After the IPO, we do not ¯nd signi¯cantly persistent di®erences in performance
between newly listed companies (both acquiring and non-acquiring) and industry
medians. We only note that the CFRoA for IPO companies is larger in the short run
after the IPO, while the RoA is signi¯cantly larger only in the ¯fth year after the
listing. When we compare acquiring and non-acquiring IPO ¯rms' performance, we
note that the RoA is always larger for acquiring ¯rms, but di®erences are never
statistically signi¯cant. On the other hand, di®erences in the CFRoA are positive and
Table 4. (Continued )
Panel B: Intercept model
Intercept Slope (pre-issue
adjusted performance)
CFRoA
Acquiring IPOs post-issue performance
(industry adjusted)
0.007 0.126***
(0.007) (0.029)
Non-acquiring IPOs post-issue perfor-
mance (industry adjusted)
0.048*** 0.143*
(0.011) (0.077)
Acquiring IPOs post-issue performance
(non-acquiring ¯rms adjusted)
0.373*** 0.139**
(0.014) (0.057)
Panel C: Change model
Median change in operating
performance with respect to
year 1
Wilcoxon signed
rank z-statistic
RoA
Acquiring IPOs versus industry 0.007 0.626
Non-acquiring IPOs versus industry 0.012 1.965**
Acquiring IPOs versus non-acquiring IPOs 0.009 1.772*
CRFoA
Acquiring IPOs versus industry 0.002 0.916
Non-acquiring IPOs versus industry 0.023 3.172***
Acquiring IPOs versus non-acquiring IPOs 0.013 2.321**
Notes: This table presents the univariate analysis on the operating performance. Panel A reports median
raw RoA and CFRoA for acquiring IPO ¯rms, matched counterparts and industry medians and the
Wilcoxon signed rank z-statistic testing the equality of distributions. Panel B reports the intercept and
the coe±cient of the intercept model (standard errors in brackets). Panel C reports the median change in
performance and the Wilcoxon signed rank z-statistics testing its equality to 0.
Sample: 715 acquiring US IPO ¯rms in the period 1986–2008.
* ¼ signi¯cant at the 10% level, ** ¼ signi¯cant at the 5% level, *** ¼ signi¯cant at the 1% level.
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statistically signi¯cant for acquiring IPO ¯rms in the third and fourth year after the issue,
suggesting a positive impact of acquisition-based strategies on long-run value creation.
To further analyze this issue, we implement the intercept and the change model,
which provide more insights on performance changes.
Panel B reports the results relative to the intercept model. We ¯rst note that in
all the regressions, regardless the measure of operating performance, the coe±cient
relative to the persistence in cash °ows is positive and statistically signi¯cant. This
means that companies exhibiting larger cash °ows before the IPO continue to deliver
better operating returns after the access to capital market. We also ¯nd that the
performance of acquiring IPO ¯rms does not decline relatively to already listed
industry peers (the intercept is positive and statistically signi¯cant in the model
based on the RoA, while it is not statistically signi¯cant in the model based on the
CFRoA). On the other hand, non-acquiring IPO ¯rms seem to underperform rela-
tively to already listed ¯rms in the same industry, as the intercept of the regression is
always negative and statistically signi¯cant at the 1% level. This result is consistent
with the literature on the decline in the operating performance after equity issues
(see, among the others, Jain & Kini (1994), Mikkelson et al. (1997), Pagano et al.
(1998), Welch & Ritter (2002)).
Finally, the intercept model comparing acquiring IPO ¯rms to their non-
acquiring peers reports a signi¯cant improvement in performance for acquiring ¯rms
(the intercept is positive and statistically signi¯cant at the 1% level in both the models).
Despite the bias issues related to the intercept model (Ghosh 2001), the change
model con¯rms our results (see Panel C). We ¯nd that the change in the performance
for acquiring IPO ¯rms is not di®erent from the change in performance of already
listed peers. The change model also con¯rms the underperformance of non-acquiring
IPO ¯rms relatively to already listed industry peers and the overperformance of
acquiring IPO ¯rms relatively to non-acquiring counterparts.
We can conclude that, nothing else changed, acquisitions signi¯cantly improve
the operating performance and the stockholder value of US IPO ¯rms. A consequent
policy suggestion to corporate executives is to consider post-IPO M&A as a possible
solution to the well-known and documented phenomenon of underperformance
experienced in many cases by newly listed companies.
3.2. Multivariate regressions: The determinants of post-IPO
performance
The ¯rst set of regression tests is aimed at checking whether the operating perfor-
mance of IPO companies improves in the long run after controlling for ¯rm and
issuance-speci¯c characteristics.b
We introduce the following dependent variables: (i) Post-IPO RoA namely the
median RoA of the acquiring IPO ¯rm in the years [t ¼ þ2; . . . ;þ5] following the
bWhen running the econometric analysis, we used a reduced sample made up of 1112 IPOs because of
missing data. We were not able to compute pre-IPO RoA and CFRoA as a weighted average of bidder's
and target's performance mainly due to lack of data on US private ¯rms.
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IPO date less than the median RoA of the matched IPO ¯rm in the same years (ii)
Change RoA namely the di®erence between Post-IPO RoA and the RoA of the
acquiring IPO ¯rm at time t ¼ 1 net of the RoA of the matched company at the same
time. The ¯rst variable measures the di®erence in the raw performance between
acquiring IPO companies belonging to the treatment sample and matching non-
acquiring IPO companies belonging to the control sample, while the second
measures the di®erence in the incremental performance between the same samples,
comparing the values before and after the IPO. The same variables are computed
adopting the CFRoA variable.
Based on the extant literature, we introduce a set of independent and control
variables: the pre-IPO operating performance (Pre-IPO RoA); the natural logarithm
of IPO proceeds (Proceeds) as large ¯rms tend to underperform small ¯rms
(Loughran & Ritter 1997); the fraction of equity retained by pre-IPO shareholders
(Retention), that can be considered a signal of quality (Leland & Pyle 1977) and is
typically associated with positive changes in operating performance (Jain & Kini
1994); the presence of a venture capitalist among pre-IPO shareholders (VC backed),
as professional investors can bring monitoring bene¯ts and support management
e®orts (Jain & Kini 1994); the underwriter's reputation (Reputation), de¯ned as the
underwriter ranking available on Jay Ritter's website (https://site.warrington.u°.
edu/ritter/ipo-data) as IPOs supported by top-tier investment banks acting as
bookrunners and underwriters tend to experience better operating performance after
the issue (Chemmanur & Fulghieri 1994, Chan et al. 2008); the IPO initial return
(Underpricing, the percentage di®erence between the ¯rst-day stock price and the
o®er price), as the most underpriced ¯rms tend to have a lower long-run performance
(Purnanandam & Swaminathan 2004); the natural logarithm of ¯rm's agec plus 1
(Age), as younger ¯rms are also riskier and deliver on average the worst returns
(Ritter 1991); Leverage, the ratio between total ¯nancial debt outstanding at the
IPO and the book value of assets, as a proxy of default risk; Investments, the amount
spent in Capex and R&D in the ¯rst year after the IPO scaled by the book value of
assets, as Jain & Kini (2008) show that larger investment in internal growth is
associated with better long-term performance; the market-to-book (MB) ratio, which
is typically considered a proxy of growth opportunities Jain & Kini (1994). Finally,
we include a dummy variable (M&A), which takes the value 1 if the IPO company is
a ¯rst year acquirer and 0 otherwise.d It is just worth mentioning the relevance
played by such independent variable within our research design, ultimately aimed at
testing a statistically signi¯cant causal relationship between acquisition-based
strategies and post-IPO corporate growth and survival.
Table 5 reports the regression results.
We ¯rst note that some results are dependent upon the model and the measure of
operating performance employed, while other correlations are quite robust.
cFirms' founding dates are taken from Jay Ritter's website.
dWe check for multicollinearity among the independent variables. The covariance matrix is available upon
request to the authors.
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Remarkably, our major ¯nding from the empirical analysis is that the coe±cient
of the dummy variable M&A is positive and signi¯cant (although weakly for the
change model) in all the models. This result gives further support to our previous
¯ndings and corroborates the hypothesis that acquisitions after an IPO are not a
driver of underperformance, at least when operating returns are considered.
As for the control variables, we ¯nd that the operating performance signi¯cantly
improves when the IPO is assisted by a reputable underwriter, consistent with the
wide stream of contributions investigating the role of investment banks in capital
markets (Beatty & Ritter 1986, Michaely & Shaw 1994, Brav & Gompers 1997,
Carter et al. 1998, Wang et al. 2003, Dong & Michel 2011). The change models also
reveal that the operating performance signi¯cantly increases if the IPO is backed by
Table 5. Determinants of the post-IPO operating performance.
Change model Intercept model Change model Intercept model
Change RoA Post-IPO RoA Change CFRoA Post-IPO CFRoA
Proceeds 0.011 0.026*** 0.018 0.025***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007)
Leverage 0.022 0.010 0.014 0.004
(0.039) (0.016) (0.035) (0.018)
Retention 0.057* 0.004 0.088** 0.026
(0.031) (0.018) (0.038) (0.020)
VC backed 0.121*** 0.001 0.118*** 0.004
(0.023) (0.012) (0.027) (0.013)
Underpricing 0.036 0.031* 0.044 0.026
(0.030) (0.017) (0.036) (0.018)
Reputation 0.010*** 0.002* 0.010*** 0.003*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
MB 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Investments 0.041 0.049*** 0.004 0.054***
(0.035) (0.017) (0.041) (0.018)
Age 0.045*** 0.016*** 0.044*** 0.019***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005)
M&A 0.037* 0.022** 0.049* 0.027**
(0.021) (0.011) (0.025) (0.012)
Pre-IPO RoA  0.182***  
(0.021)
Pre-IPO CFRoA    0.162***
(0.020)
Constant 0.067 0.112* 0.130 0.088
(0.155) (0.066) (0.192) (0.077)
R-square adjusted 0.161 0.311 0.137 0.263
P -value F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 1112 1112 1112 1112
Notes: This table presents the multivariate regression between change in operating performance with
respect to the industry and the post-event industry adjusted operating performance. Dependent and
independent variables are described in the text. Coe±cients are reported (standard errors robust to
heteroscedasticity in brackets).
* ¼ signi¯cant at the 10% level, ** ¼ signi¯cant at the 5% level, *** ¼ signi¯cant at the 1% level.
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a venture capitalist, while the intercept models ¯nd a signi¯cant improvement in
performance when the IPO size is larger and when issuing ¯rms invest more in the
¯rst year following the IPO.
Interestingly, the coe±cient of Age is statistically signi¯cant in all the models,
but the sign changes depending on the model employed. The change model shows
that the drop in the operating performance is comparatively lower for younger ¯rms.
Yet, the intercept model highlights that there is a negative gap in absolute terms
with respect to older ¯rms.
3.3. The impact of M&A strategies on post-IPO performance
The second set of regressions is aimed at investigating the impact of acquisition
characteristics on the abnormal performance of acquiring IPO ¯rms relative to non-
acquiring ones.
In these models, the units of analysis are the single M&A deals that take place
within one year after the issue. The sample is composed by the 1005 acquisitions
performed in our period of analysis.
Again, the dependent variables are the change in the operating performance of
acquiring IPO ¯rms adjusted by matched non-acquiring IPO ¯rms (Change RoA
andChange CFRoA) and the post-IPO performance of acquiring IPO ¯rms adjusted
by non-acquiring IPO ¯rms (Post-IPO RoA and Post-IPO CFRoA).
Independent and control variables include the following: the di®erence in loga-
rithm of the IPO proceeds between the acquiring IPO company and the non-ac-
quiring matching counterpart (Di® proceeds); the di®erence in the underpricing
(Di® underpricing); the di®erence in the underwriter ranking (Di® reputation); a
dummy variable (Di® VC) which takes value 0 if both the acquiring company and
the non-acquiring counterpart are either backed or not by venture capitalists, 1 if the
acquiring IPO ¯rm is backed by a VC and the non-acquiring is not, 1 if the non-
acquiring IPO ¯rm is backed by a venture capitalist and the acquiring IPO ¯rm is
not; the di®erence in the fraction of equity retained by insiders (Di® retention); and
the di®erence in MB ratios (Di® MB).
The control variables related to the characteristics of the M&A transaction are
Crossborder, a dummy variable taking value 1 if the target company operates outside
the US (Moller & Schlingemann 2004); Diversi¯cation, a dummy variable taking value
1 if the target company operates in a di®erent industry (de¯ned by 2-digit SIC code as in
Jain & Kini (2008); Cash and Stock, dummy variables taking value 1 if the acquisition is
paid 100% by cash and stock, respectively, as the method of payment can a®ect op-
erating performance (Linn & Switzer 2001, Ghosh 2001); Listed if the target company is
already listed in the market (O±cer 2007); Hostile, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
acquisition is labeled as hostile by the managers of the target company, 0 otherwise.
The regression results are reported in Table 6.
As in the previous analysis, we ¯nd that some of the results are dependent upon
the regression model employed. Three out of four models ¯nd that di®erences in
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underwriter rank are positively associated with performance measures. The e®ect of a
one-point increase in ranking is an operating performance increase ranging from 0.4%
to 0.8% depending on the model employed.
Intercept models show that the operating performance of IPO acquirers improves
relative to non-IPO acquirers when they are smaller in size, while two out of
four models report increased operating performance when a venture capitalist is
backing the acquirer and not the matched ¯rm belonging to the control sample.
Table 6. M&A characteristics and operating performance.
Change model Intercept model Change model Intercept model
Change RoA Post-IPO RoA Change CFRoA Post-IPO CFRoA
Di® proceeds 0.001 0.036*** 0.019 0.044***
(0.022) (0.012) (0.027) (0.013)
Di® underpricing 0.063 0.026 0.063 0.027
(0.045) (0.021) (0.053) (0.021)
Di® reputation 0.004 0.004** 0.008* 0.006**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Di® VC 0.048 0.024* 0.062* 0.026
(0.030) (0.014) (0.037) (0.017)
Di® retention 0.057 0.102*** 0.115 0.146***
(0.075) (0.037) (0.091) (0.041)
Di® MB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crossborder 0.024 0.031 0.007 0.039
(0.054) (0.032) (0.065) (0.035)
Diversi¯cation 0.043 0.019 0.064 0.022
(0.044) (0.021) (0.053) (0.023)
Cash 0.023 0.042* 0.020 0.041*
(0.036) (0.021) (0.045) (0.024)
Stock 0.168** 0.085** 0.191** 0.083**
(0.071) (0.034) (0.085) (0.037)
Listed 0.479** 0.173** 0.522** 0.155**
(0.212) (0.070) (0.244) (0.064)
Hostile 0.404 0.206** 0.367 0.182*
(0.247) (0.102) (0.281) (0.099)
Pre-IPO RoA  0.319***  
(0.030)
Pre-IPO CFRoA    0.243***
(0.022)
Constant 0.014 0.085 0.015 0.037
(0.106) (0.087) (0.161) (0.124)
Adj. R-square 0.147 0.398 0.131 0.330
P -value F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 775 775 756 756
Notes: This table presents the multivariate regression between change in operating performance with
respect to the matched ¯rm or the post-event matched ¯rm adjusted operating performance. The
variables are described in the text. Coe±cients are reported (standard errors robust to hetero-
scedasticity in brackets).
Sample size varies due to data availability.
* ¼ signi¯cant at the 10% level, ** ¼ signi¯cant at the 5% level, *** ¼ signi¯cant at the 1% level.
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These results are consistent with the ¯ndings reported in Table 5 and support the
evidence that the relationship emerging from the empirical analysis does not hold
for any newly listed company, but is conditioned to a precise set of IPO-speci¯c
characteristics.
Among the set of control variables related to the acquisition-speci¯c character-
istics, we ¯nd that the operating performance improves when the target is already
listed on the stock exchange and when the acquisition is fully paid with stock.
The ¯rst result contrasts with O±cer (2007), who reports lower cumulated ab-
normal returns at the announcement of an acquisition when the target company is
listed. One possible explanation for our ¯nding is that already listed ¯rms are subject
to the scrutiny of the market. Their stock is daily monitored by institutional
investors and equity analysts (Kolasinski & Kothari 2008, Bonini et al. 2010); this
°ow of information characterizing listed ¯rms can reduce the risk of overpayment by
managers of the IPO ¯rm. Indeed, due to the separation between ownership and
control, consistent with agency theory, managers of the IPO ¯rm could be incen-
tivized to pursue their personal objectives, for example, through building empires by
pursuing acquisitions aggressively. Our results suggest that the monitoring role
played by the stock market can reduce these incentives.
O±cer et al. (2009) document larger cumulated abnormal returns at the an-
nouncement when the target is di±cult to be evaluated (i.e. when the target is not
listed). As in our sample, stock-¯nanced acquisitions are mostly related to private targets
(only in 15 cases out of 202 fully stock-¯nanced acquisitions involve listed targets) which
are more di±cult to be evaluated compared to already listed ¯rms, we can accordingly
argue that running stock for stock deals reduces the target valuation uncertainty and
allows to e®ectively split the risk of overvaluation between the acquirer and the target.
Furthermore, intercept models show that the change in operating performance is
also positively related to pure cash acquisitions and negatively related to hostile
takeovers. The ¯rst ¯nding is consistent with Ghosh (2001), while the second result is
consistent with Martynova et al. (2007).
3.4. Survival analysis
In order to complement our results on the long-term operating performance of ac-
quiring IPO ¯rms, we perform a survival analysis through Cox Proportional Hazard
models (see, among the contributions using this methodology, Jain & Kini (1999),
Manigart et al. (2002), Audretsch & Lehmann (2005), Jain & Kini (2008), Pommet
(2012), Ben Amor & Kooli (2016)).
The sample comprises all the 3823 IPO ¯rms. The dependent variable is the
logarithm of hazard ratios. The time variable is the number of months from the 13th
month after the IPO date (as the ¯rst 12 months comprise the acquisition period) to
the end of 2013 or to the delisting date, if earlier.
In Table 7, we apply the model to all the delisted companies (¯rst column).
We then run separate models in columns 2 and 3 for delistings due to bankruptcy
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(CRSP delisting code higher than 300) and delisting due to the ¯rm's acquisition
(delisting code in CRSP lower than 300) to understand the di®erent impact of M&As
on the alternative causes of exit from the ¯nancial market.
The independent variables are the same variables used in the ¯rst set of multi-
variate models, namely: Reputation, Underpricing, Proceeds, Leverage, Retention,
VC backed, M=B, Investments, Age and M&A.
Considering the aggregate sample, we ¯nd that the time to the delisting is pos-
itively correlated to Underpricing, Leverage and Retention, while there is a negative
correlation with Investments and Age. We posit that the riskiest ¯rms (those with
higher underpricing and higher level of leverage) are likely to delist faster from the
market. Interesting to observe, M&A is also positively correlated with the time to
delisting, this indicates that acquiring ¯rms delist faster from the stock exchange.
However, this result does not seem to contradict our previous ¯ndings. In fact, by
looking at the coe±cients reported in column 2 for the acquired IPO companies, we
¯nd that the time to being acquired is positively correlated with Underpricing, Re-
tention, VC backed andM&A, while it is negatively correlated with Investments and
Age. Our results show therefore that the probability of being acquired is larger when
the IPO company is backed by a venture capitalist and when the IPO ¯rm pursues a
Table 7. Survival analysis.
Time to delisting Time to being acquired Time to bankruptcy
M&A 0.100** 0.099** 0.099*
(0.047) (0.050) (0.056)
Reputation 0.006 0.002 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Underpricing 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Assets 0.028 0.030 0.067***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
Leverage 0.187** 0.011 0.208**
(0.092) (0.102) (0.105)
Retention 0.611*** 0.580*** 0.634***
(0.059) (0.062) (0.067)
VC backed 0.056 0.127*** 0.022
(0.040) (0.043) (0.047)
M=B 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Investments 0.144** 0.120* 0.088
(0.066) (0.071) (0.073)
Age 0.107*** 0.079*** 0.100***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
P -Value of F -test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 3058 2705 2281
Notes: This table presents the survival analysis. The independent and control variables are
de¯ned in the text. Coe±cients are reported (standard errors in brackets).
Sample size: 3058 IPO companies delisted before the end of 2013.
*¼ signi¯cant at the 10% level, **¼ signi¯cant at the 5% level, ***¼ signi¯cant at the 1% level.
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growth strategy focused on taking over other companies in the ¯rst year after the
IPO. In other words, the more an IPO company is active in acquiring other com-
panies, the more likely it will be acquired in the future, arguably as a consequence of
its increased attractiveness in the market for corporate control.
Column 3 reports the results based on the time to bankruptcy. We thus exclude
from the sample ¯rms that delisted because they were acquired. We ¯nd that the
time to failure is shorter with Underpricing, Leverage, Retention and M&A, while it
is longer with Size and the Age of the IPO company.
Not reported in the tables, we ¯nd that the mean change in RoA (adjusted
considering the matching companies) for acquiring IPO ¯rms that were acquired
within ¯ve years from their IPO is 10.15%, compared to 3.81% for ¯rms that did not
delist. The di®erence in performance between the two groups is statistically signi¯-
cant at the 5% level. We also ¯nd that the mean-adjusted change in RoA for the
acquiring IPO ¯rms that failed within ¯ve years from their IPO is 3.77%, and the
di®erence in performance with the acquiring IPO ¯rms that did not delist is negative
and also statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level.
Overall, our results suggest that when acquiring IPO companies deliver good
operating performance, they get acquired faster by other companies. On the other
hand, when they underperform, they follow the path to bankruptcy more quickly.
These results suggest that M&A strategies performed by newly listed ¯rms lead to
clear and unambiguous results, which could be either positive or negative change in
operating returns. In the former case, the straight consequence will be an acquisition
while in the latter, a bankruptcy. In both cases, M&A strategies structurally a®ect
the traditional duration of the IPO companies' life cycle, accelerating the time to
failure or to success.
4. Conclusions
Our paper analyzes the performance and survival of 715 US acquiring IPO ¯rms running
at least one acquisition in the ¯rst year after going public in the period 1986–2008.
As a major ¯nding from our empirical analysis, contrary to some previously cited
contributions, we ¯nd that IPO acquirers experience on average an improvement in
RoA and CFRoA when compared to non-acquiring IPO ¯rms. The acquiring IPO
companies' observed change in operating performance, furthermore, is in line with
that of their listed peer companies, in a period up to ¯ve years after the listing. These
results hold after controlling for both IPO and ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics.
Among the acquisition-speci¯c characteristics that are likely to be predictors
of an improvement over time in the IPO company's operating performance, we
¯nd stock payments and acquisition of listed targets to be the most persistent
and statistically signi¯cant ones. One possible explanation for these ¯ndings can be
attributed to either the higher monitoring on already listed targets, which avoids
overpayment, or the market certi¯cation for IPO companies' stocks, which makes
target companies' shareholders more eager to accept to be paid with buyers' shares.
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We also investigate the impact of acquisitions on the time to delisting. We ¯nd
that acquiring IPO companies leave the stock exchange faster when compared to
non-acquiring matching companies, regardless the reason of the delisting. However,
as a further ¯nding emerging by successive regression analyses, acquiring IPO
companies showing positive changes in operating performance are more likely to be
the target of other bidders, whereas acquiring IPO companies with poor operating
performance tend to go bankrupt more quickly. Therefore, post-IPO M&A activity
does seem to structurally a®ect companies' survival, accelerate either their time to
success or their time to failure.
We think that our research can be valuable for both academicians and practi-
tioners. This work sets the ground for further academic research on the e®ect of
M&As on IPO performance, highlighting the importance of considering operating
returns and cash °ows as appropriate proxies for pro¯tability and value creation.
Finally, a possible implication for executives of IPO companies lies in the impact
produced by M&A-focused strategies on future survival: a more in-depth investi-
gation about the deal structure, the target selection and the estimated sources of
synergies will allow to shed further light on alternative future growth/decline paths
available after the access to stock markets.
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